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Abstract
We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personal-
ized pricing (PP), whereby ﬁrms charge diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent consumers, based on their
willingness to pay. We embed personalized pricing in a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation,
and show how it aﬀects ﬁrms’ choices over quality. We show that ﬁrms’ optimal pricing strate-
gies with PP may be non-monotonic in consumer valuations. When the PP ﬁrm has a high
quality both ﬁrms raise their qualities, relative to the uniform pricing case. Conversely, when
the PP ﬁrm has low quality, both ﬁrms lower their qualities. Although many ﬁrms are trying to
implement such pricing policies, we ﬁnd that a higher quality ﬁrm can actually be worse oﬀ with
PP. While it is optimal for the ﬁrm adopting PP to increase product diﬀerentiation, the non-PP
ﬁrm seeks to reduce diﬀerentiation by moving in closer in the quality space. While PP results
in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price competition between ﬁrms. Since
this entails a change in equilibrium qualities, the nature of the cost function determines whether
ﬁrms gain or lose by implementing such PP policies. Despite the threat of ﬁrst-degree price
discrimination, we ﬁnd that personalized pricing with competing ﬁrms can lead to an overall
increase in consumer welfare.
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1 Introduction
Diﬀerent consumers typically derive diﬀerent value from the same product. Firms often respond
to this heterogeneity in valuations by trying to determine what customers will pay. This is done in
a variety of ways: by understanding the nature of a customer’s business and how the product will
be used, by asking about their budget during a negotiation or via market research using diﬀerent
collaborative and content ﬁltering techniques. The information about willingness to pay is then
used to provide a personalized price for the customer.
In this paper, we use the term personalized pricing, or PP, to refer to the limiting case in
which a ﬁrm can implement a pricing policy based on complete knowledge of the willingness to
pay of each consumer.1 We bypass the question of how the ﬁrm acquires this knowledge. Rather,
we focus on the implications this has for ﬁrm strategies. Speciﬁcally, we examine the following
questions: (i) How does competition aﬀect equilibrium product quality outcomes when ﬁrms engage
in personalized pricing? (ii) Does the improvement in ﬁrms’ knowledge of individual consumers
alleviate or intensify price competition? (iii) What are the tradeoﬀs ﬁrms face in adopting PP?
(iv) How does PP aﬀect consumer welfare?
Examples of personalized pricing come from the markets for both consumer and business prod-
ucts. Firms selling large proprietary enterprise-level software often ﬁnalize the price through a
negotiation. Vendors typically work with clients to conduct an ROI (Return on Investment) analy-
sis to determine the beneﬁt (in the form of cost savings or revenue enhancements) of the product
to the client. Sweeney et al., describe such a collaborative development of ROI by Teradata Inc.
in fostering sales of its data-warehousing technology.2 The ROI analysis is used to price software.
For instance, a California-based in-store demand planning software developer sets the price as a
percentage of a mutually determined ROI. This is also common practice in the sale of enterprise
telephone cost auditing software.3
1Since, the amount of information required for implementing PP is high, in practice, ﬁrms may not know valuations
precisely. Hence, our results should be interpreted as the solution to an important limiting case which provides a
useful benchmark – the case of perfect information.
2Sweeney, R., Davis, R. and M. Jeﬀery, “Teradata Data Mart Consolidation Return on Invest-
ment at GST”, 2002, http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/jeﬀery/htm/cases/Data%20Mart% %20Consolida-
tion%20ROI%20Case%20at%20GST.pdf
3These anecdotes were communicated to us in conversations with Steve Acterman, Director Corporate IT Man-
agement, Volt Information Sciences, Harnish Kanani, Senior Vice President Global Services, Emagia Corporation,
Tim Johnson, Account Executive, Apreo Inc.
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The market for computer servers, storage devices and workstations in the Asia-Paciﬁc region
combines PP and quality diﬀerentiation. Major players such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Sun
Microsystems use personalized discounting for diﬀerent customers based on ROI, even at the same
quality levels. There is also a trend towards increasing the degree of service quality and value-added
software diﬀerentiation in the industry. For instance, in the UNIX platform, HP and IBM cater
to the high-end market, while Sun serves the low-end market.4 Other examples of value-based
personalized pricing are found in the healthcare (Smith and Nagle, 2002) and chemicals industries.
Online retailers with their ability to collect data are well-positioned to take advantage of dy-
namic pricing. In a well-known example, Amazon oﬀered diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent consumers
on its popular DVD titles.5 Although Amazon’s experiment was short-lived due to a consumer
backlash, it has since found innovative ways of implementing PP without annoying consumers,
through the use of the “Gold Box”. Each consumer is provided access to a prominently displayed
Gold Box with their name (e.g. John Doe’s Gold Box) on webpages at Amazon. Opening the Gold
Box provides access to a limited number of products with special discounts that are not available
outside the Gold Box. The items oﬀered in the Gold Box are diﬀerent for diﬀerent consumers.
This allows Amazon to charge personalized prices. This is an example of the continuing evolution
of PP and an indication of the likely use of such pricing by online retailers. Chen and Iyer (2002)
mention several other examples of customized pricing.6 Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) provide an
empirical study that compares several approaches for determining consumer willingness to pay.
We consider a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly framework in which one or both ﬁrms can per-
fectly identify valuations of heterogenous consumers.7 A monopolist with such information could
engage in ﬁrst-degree price discrimination. As Armstrong and Vickers (2001) point out, the lit-
erature on competitive price discrimination is not as extensive as in the monopoly case. They
provide an elegant framework that incorporates much of the earlier work on price competition in
4“Are Proprietary RISC Servers More Expensive Than Their UNIX Alternatives?”, TechWise Research, Incorpo-
rated, May 1999.
5Morneau, J., “Dynamic Pricing: Who Really Wins?,” TechWeb Sep. 29, 2000.
6These include major providers of long distance telephone service (such as AT&T, MCI and Sprint), direct mar-
keting companies like Land’s End and L.L. Bean, who have individual speciﬁc catalog prices, and ﬁnancial services
and banks, who engage in PP through personalized discounts on card fees. Zhang (2003) mentions Wells Fargo and
MBNA in this regard.
7We ignore the possibility of mistargeting. Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang (2001) show that mistargeting can
have an important eﬀect, by softening price competition in the market, and qualitatively changing the incentives for
competing ﬁrms engaged in individual marketing.
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an environment with multiple ﬁrms. Recent work on customer recognition and behavior-based
price discrimination includes Villas-Boas (1999) and Acquisti and Varian (2002). Much of the re-
cent work on perfect price discrimination has been done either in the context of horizontal product
diﬀerentiation (Vives and Thisse, 1988, Chen and Iyer, 2002, Ulph and Vulkan, 2002, Bhaskar and
To, 2002) or monopoly (Aron, Sunderarajan and Viswanathan, 2003). Shaﬀer and Zhang (2002)
consider perfect price discrimination by competing ﬁrms in a model that includes both horizontal
and vertical diﬀerentiation. Desai (2001) analyzes second-degree price discrimination with both
vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation. Dellaert and Syam (2002) bring into focus the issues sur-
rounding mass-customization via an analysis of consumer-producer interaction. We contribute to
the literature in this ﬁeld by incorporating perfect price discrimination in a vertically diﬀerenti-
ated duopolistic setting. Since our paper examines the issue of how ﬁrms’ knowledge of individual
customers aﬀects the nature of their strategic interactions, it complements the work done on how
customers’ knowledge about ﬁrms may aﬀect ﬁrms’ competitive strategies (Lal and Sarvary, 1999,
and Zettelmeyer, 2000).
We derive a number of analytical results on ﬁrm pricing, quality diﬀerentiation, and consumer
welfare when one or both ﬁrms have PP. First, if the ﬁrm with PP has a low quality, its optimal
price is non-monotonic in consumers’ willingness to pay. That is, some high valuation consumers
are oﬀered lower prices than some low valuation ones. Second, when one ﬁrm adopts PP, the other
ﬁrm responds by lowering its price. This is a competitive response: a ﬁrm with PP knows the
valuation of each consumer, and can therefore charge prices as low as its own marginal cost to a
speciﬁc consumer. It therefore encroaches into the market share of the other ﬁrm, which responds
to the increased competition by reducing its price. Third, when only one of the ﬁrms adopts PP,
it is optimal for it to increase product diﬀerentiation. This can be interpreted as a move to reduce
competition with the other ﬁrm. When the cost of quality is quadratic, if the low quality ﬁrm
adopts PP, both ﬁrms reduce their quality levels. Conversely, when the high quality ﬁrm adopts
PP, both ﬁrms increase their quality levels. We show that when both ﬁrms adopt PP, the high
quality ﬁrm reduces its quality while the low quality ﬁrm raises its quality. Finally, consumer
surplus falls (compared to the no PP case) if the PP ﬁrm has low quality, but rises if the PP ﬁrm
has high quality. In fact, consumer surplus is highest when both ﬁrms have PP.
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In addition to the above results, for a wide range of cost parameters, we demonstrate some
properties of ﬁrm proﬁt with PP. First, within this range, it is a dominant strategy for the low
quality ﬁrm to adopt PP. That is, regardless of whether the high quality ﬁrm adopts PP or not,
the low quality ﬁrm makes a higher proﬁt with PP. Conversely, the high quality ﬁrm can actually
be worse oﬀ with PP and should adopt PP only if the costs of quality are not too steep. This
paradox emerges because in a vertical diﬀerentiation context, the other ﬁrm responds by lowering
its quality. Next, if marginal costs sharply increase in quality, then both ﬁrms earn lower proﬁts
compared to the case where neither has PP. Essentially, they are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.8
However, if costs are not too convex, both ﬁrms increase proﬁts when they adopt PP. Thus, our
paper highlights that the cost-of-quality eﬀect can lead to circumstances wherein ﬁrms can avoid
the prisoner’s dilemma situation when they both have PP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the model. In Section
3 we show that when only one ﬁrm has PP, there are two possible equilibria, with the PP ﬁrm
having either a low quality or a high quality.9 We next consider the case of both ﬁrms using PP.
In Section 4 we analyze the impact of PP on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and consumer surplus. This allows us
to consider the question of when ﬁrms will adopt PP. We discuss some implications of our ﬁndings
in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider personalized pricing in a duopoly model of vertical diﬀerentiation.10 Two ﬁrms compete
in both the quality and price of the products they oﬀer. Formally, we model their competition as
a three-stage game. At the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms simultaneously choose the quality levels of their
products. At stage 2, the ﬁrms choose their prices. When neither ﬁrm has access to PP, prices
are chosen simultaneously. When only one ﬁrm has access to PP, the ﬁrm without PP chooses
its price ﬁrst, followed by the ﬁrm with access to PP. Personalized pricing is executed for each
8Shaﬀer and Zhang (1995), Thisse and Vives(1988) obtain similar results in models of price discrimination.
9We do not consider the question of which equilibrium will emerge. In our model, neither ﬁrm has the option of
forcing the other into a particular equilibrium.
10Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), building on research by Mussa and Rosen (1978),
develop duopoly models of vertical diﬀerentiation and show that to reduce price competition, ﬁrms seek maximal
product diﬀerentiation. Moorthy (1988) extends the basic model by incorporating variable production costs and
allowing consumers the opportunity to not buy a product. This results in less than maximal product diﬀerentiation.
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consumer at the point of sale. Hence, a ﬁrm which engages in PP chooses its price after a rival
that has a uniform pricing policy (which must be posted and committed to before sales occur). In
other words, the ﬂexibility implied by personalized pricing incorporates an implicit assumption on
ﬂexibility in timing as well. When both ﬁrms have PP, the order of moves at stage 2 does not aﬀect
the outcome; for convenience, we again posit that prices are chosen simultaneously. Once prices
are chosen, at the last stage of the game (stage 3), consumers decide which, if any, product to buy.
If a consumer purchases a product of quality q at price p, his utility is U(θ) = θq − p, where
θ ∈ [0, 1]. A consumer has positive utility for one unit only. The type parameter θ indicates a
consumer’s marginal valuation for quality. For any given quality, a consumer with a higher θ is
willing to pay more for the product than one with a lower θ. If either of the two products oﬀers
a positive net utility, a consumer buys the one that maximizes his surplus. Otherwise, he chooses
not to buy either product. It is immediate to show in this model that, if the qualities of the ﬁrms
are the same, personalized pricing adds no value—the result is Bertrand competition, with both
ﬁrms pricing at marginal cost. Hence, in this paper, we consider a model in which ﬁrms ﬁrst choose
qualities (which will be diﬀerent in equilibrium), and then prices.
Consistent with prior literature (for example, Desai, 2001), we assume that ﬁrms have a marginal
cost of production which is invariant with the quantity, but depends on the quality of the product.
That is, both ﬁrms have the same cost function, but depending on the quality levels they choose,
their marginal costs may diﬀer in equilibrium. Each ﬁrm has a constant marginal cost for producing
the good, denoted by c. Further c(·) is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex in
q. That is, c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. Quality in this model is a broad notion that encompasses any feature
that may aﬀect a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good. These could include features intrinsic
to the product itself (such as durability and functionality) or those related to the quality of the
shopping experience, or the service level provided by the ﬁrm (such as warranties and customer
service). Quality is observed perfectly by all consumers.
Given the quality levels and prices oﬀered by the two ﬁrms, consumers make their choices.
Suppose, in the benchmark case of uniform pricing, ﬁrm 1 oﬀers (q1, p1), and ﬁrm 2 oﬀers (q2, p2).
There will be a subset of consumers (including null) who buy from each ﬁrm, 1 and 2. The proﬁt of
ﬁrm j is its market coverage times (pj − c(qj)). In the case of PP, we allow one or both ﬁrms to be
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exogenously equipped with a technology that perfectly reveals the consumer’s type before the price
is disclosed to the consumer. Both ﬁrms know which ﬁrm has PP before the game is played. While
the ﬁrm oﬀers the same quality product to all consumers, it can choose a personalized price for
each consumer. In this case, ﬁrm j’s proﬁt from consumer θ is (pj(θ)− c(qj)). Let cj denote c(qj).
In practice, implementing personalized pricing may well incur some ﬁxed costs. However, if such
costs are independent of the quality of the product being oﬀered by the ﬁrm, they do not aﬀect
the qualitative nature of the results. For simplicity, we treat these costs as zero.11 We consider
pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of this three-stage game. That is, for any strategies the
ﬁrms may choose at stages 1 and 2, consumers behave optimally at stage 3. Firms, in turn, not
only anticipate this behavior, but also choose optimal prices, given quality levels, at stage 2. The
subgame-perfect equilibrium is determined by backward induction, starting with stage 3.
Consider the case when neither ﬁrm has access to PP (we call this the no-PP case). As shown
by Moorthy (1988), in equilibrium at stage 3, the ﬁrms share the market in the following manner.12
There exist threshold consumers θ
h
and θ

, such that consumers with valuations greater than a
cutoﬀ level θ
h
and less than 1 purchase product h, and those with valuations between a second
cutoﬀ level θ

and θ
h
purchase product . This situation is depicted in Figure 1 below. The details
of the proﬁt equations and reaction functions are provided in Section 1.1 of the Appendix.
0 1θ
h
θ

ﬀﬀﬀ
Buy product hBuy product Buy neither product
Figure 1: Consumers’ purchasing decision by consumer type (θ)
The same intuition also applies in the case that one or both ﬁrms have PP. Of course, for the
equilibrium to have these properties with both ﬁrms existing, it must be that 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1. In
solving the various cases, we show that an equilibrium with these properties exists.
11In Section 4, we provide guidelines as to when ﬁrms should or should not invest in PP if the ﬁxed costs are
non-zero.
12Moorthy assumes quadratic costs, but this result depends only on consumer preferences.
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3 Duopoly with Personalized Pricing
Suppose ﬁrst that only one ﬁrm has PP. There are two equilibria in this case; one in which the PP
ﬁrm has a lower quality than the other ﬁrm, and a second one in which the PP ﬁrm has a higher
quality. We consider each of these, and then examine the case in which both ﬁrms have PP.
3.1 PP Firm Oﬀers Low Quality
We use the superscript  to denote this case, while the subscripts h,  denote the ﬁrms. In the
spirit of backward induction, suppose ﬁrms choose qualities q
h
, q

at stage 1, and consider stage 2
ﬁrst. Let p
h
, p

(θ) denote the optimal prices chosen at stage 2 (as functions of q
h
, q

). Similarly,
let πh

, π

denote the proﬁt functions, as functions of q
h
and q

alone (that is, after substituting in
the optimal stage 2 prices). For brevity, in the notation we often suppress the dependence of these
functions on q
h
, q

(this dependence is clear in the expressions exhibited below). We use qh

and q

to denote equilibrium qualities chosen at stage 1. A notation guide is provided in the Appendix.
We restrict attention to qualities q that satisfy c(q) < q. The rationale for this is as follows:
the consumer with θ = 1 is the one who is willing to pay the most for a given product with quality
q. This consumer is willing to pay up to q for the product. If c(q) ≥ q, a ﬁrm cannot obtain a
positive market share unless it also makes a loss. Regardless of the quality it chooses at stage 1,
it can always prevent a loss by charging consumers a price p ≥ q, which ensures zero sales. Hence,
we only consider qualities with c(q) < q. Since the cost function is convex, it is suﬃcient to impose
this condition on the higher quality ﬁrm.
In this case, ﬁrm  knows the type of each consumer, and hence can oﬀer prices that depend
on θ. It must be willing to oﬀer a price as low as its marginal cost, c

= c(q

), to each consumer, if
necessary. Further, consistent with price discrimination, it will charge each consumer as high a price
as it can. At stage 3, ﬁrm h (which does not have PP) will operate in a market segment [θ
h
, 1], and
ﬁrm  in a market segment [θ

, θ
h
]. Consider ﬁrst the location of the marginal consumer θ
h
, who
is indiﬀerent between buying from either ﬁrm. This consumer must obtain the same utility from
either product. If p

(θ
h
) > c

, then ﬁrm  would lower its price for this consumer, to ensure that he
strictly prefers to buy product . Hence, it must be that p

(θ
h
) = c

. Therefore, this consumer is
deﬁned by θ
h
q
h
−p
h
= θ
h
q

− c

, or θ
h
=
p
h
−c

q
h
−q

. For now, the qualities could be arbitrary, so deﬁne
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θ
h
= min{p

h
−c

q
h
−q

, 1}. Similarly, θ

is deﬁned as the consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying
product  and not consuming at all. Again, it must be that p

(θ

) = c

, else ﬁrm  could increase
its proﬁt by reducing its price for this consumer. Hence, θ

q

− c

= 0 or θ

= cq

> 0. Finally, the
consumer who is exactly indiﬀerent between not buying at all and buying from ﬁrm h is deﬁned as
θˆ =
p
h
q
h
. At arbitrary qualities, it may be that this leads to θˆ > 1, so deﬁne θˆ = min{p

h
q
h
, 1}.
In the pricing subgame, we further restrict attention to prices that satisfy p ≥ c(q) for a given
quality q. No ﬁrm is willing to sell to consumers at a price less than its marginal cost (since this
results in a loss). However, for some qualities, there exist equilibria in the subgame at which ﬁrm
h may price below its cost, but makes zero sales. Firm h earns zero proﬁts across these equilibria,
so we consider the equilibrium in which it prices no lower than its cost, c(q
h
).
Now, consider stage 2. Suppose ﬁrms have chosen qualities qh, q at stage 1. We show that, at
stage 2, the optimal price function of ﬁrm  is non-monotonic in consumer type; that is, it charges
some high valuation consumers less than it charges some low valuation consumers.
Proposition 1 Suppose ﬁrms choose any qualities q
h
and q

at stage 1, with associated costs
c
h
= c(qh) and c = c(q), that satisfy (i) q < qh and (ii) ch < qh. In the equilibrium of the pricing
subgame starting at stage 2, we have 0 < θ

< θ
h
≤ 1. Further,
(a) ﬁrm h sets a price p
h
= max{12 (qh − q + ch + c) , ch}
(b) ﬁrm  sets a price p

(θ) that is non-monotonic in a consumer’s valuation θ, such that some
higher valuation consumers obtain lower prices than some lower valuation ones. Speciﬁcally,
p

(θ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θq

if θ ∈ [θ

, θˆ]
p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

) if θ ∈ (θˆ, θ
h
]
c

if θ ∈ [0, θˆ) or θ ∈ (θ
h
, 1].
This situation is depicted in Figure 2. The intuition is that in the market segment [0, θˆ], ﬁrm
 faces no competition from ﬁrm h. These consumers are not willing to buy product h at the
oﬀered quality and price. Hence, ﬁrm  is able to extract their entire consumer surplus. However,
consumers in the range [θˆ, 1] obtain a positive utility from consuming product h as well. Hence,
ﬁrm  faces competition in this range, and must oﬀer consumers at least as high a surplus as ﬁrm
h, to induce them to buy product . Thus, the threat of latent competition from ﬁrm h provides
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these consumers with a positive surplus that is monotonically increasing in their valuations.
  















p

(θ)
p
h
0 1
c

θ

θ
h
θˆ
ﬀ  ﬀ 

Firm ′s market Firm h′s market
Prices of , h
Figure 2: Prices of ﬁrms  and h when ﬁrm  alone has PP
Now, consider the choice of qualities at stage 1. In Lemma 1 in the appendix, we show that at
the equilibrium qualities, given the prices exhibited in Proposition 1, the threshold consumer types
satisfy 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1. Hence, we ignore the Kuhn-Tucker constraints implied by these conditions,
and focus on the interior solution.
Suppose ﬁrm  chooses q

, and ﬁrm h chooses q
h
. Further, suppose both ﬁrms choose optimal
prices (as given by Proposition 1), given the two qualities. Then, the proﬁt functions of the two
ﬁrms are:
π

(q
h
, q

) =
∫ θˆ
θ

(θq

− c

)dθ +
∫ θ
h
θˆ
(p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)− c

)dθ =
(p
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)q
h
q

(1)
π
h
(q
h
, q

) = (p
h
− c
h
) (1− θ
h
(p
h
, q
h
, c

, q

)) =
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(2)
When ﬁrm  adopts PP, the competitive response of ﬁrm h is to reduce its price. This is the
“price competition eﬀect.” PP allows ﬁrm  to set a price as low as marginal cost for a particular
consumer, to induce him to buy product . This leads to an immediate increase in the market
coverage of ﬁrm , both amongst low valuation consumers, and those who were previously buying
product h. In response to this heightened competition from ﬁrm , ﬁrm h strategically reduces
its price. This response of ﬁrm h, in turn, induces ﬁrm  to lower its own quality, to reduce the
competition with ﬁrm h and tap some more uncontested marginal consumers on the left. We
demonstrate these eﬀects in Lemma 2 of the Appendix, which also derives the reaction functions
for the two ﬁrms.
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Of course, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms change their qualities from the no-PP case. If the cost
function is quadratic, we show that both ﬁrms reduce their qualities.
Proposition 2 Suppose the cost function is quadratic; that is, c(q) = Aq2. In equilibrium, when
ﬁrm  adopts PP, both ﬁrms reduce their qualities compared to the no-PP case. In particular,
q
h
= 0.388A and q


= 0.164A .
Since analytic solutions are infeasible in the general case, we numerically solve for qualities using
a cost function c(q) = qα, where α > 1. In the numeric solution, we check that the constraints
0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1 are satisﬁed for each α (so that each ﬁrm has a positive market share in all cases).
The results are shown in Figure 3.13 If the cost function is not too convex (in particular, α ≤ 1.2),
ﬁrm h chooses a higher quality in equilibrium. Conversely, if the cost function is highly convex
(α > 1.2), it chooses a lower quality.
The intuition for this is as follows. PP allows ﬁrm  to charge a price as low as its cost c

. This
lets it penetrate an untapped market segment with lower valuations than it is currently serving,
as well as make some headway into the market served by ﬁrm h. This is the “market coverage
eﬀect.” Firm h has two competitive responses to this. First, as a result of the price competition
eﬀect, it reduces its price. Second, when costs are suﬃciently convex, it reduces its quality. By
moving towards the low quality ﬁrm, h increases the uncontested portion of its market. This
further induces ﬁrm  to reduce its own quality, to mitigate the more aggressive competition from
ﬁrm h. However, if costs are almost linear (i.e., for low values of α), ﬁrm h increases its quality
in equilibrium, and increases its price. Though this entails a lower market coverage, the nature of
the cost function implies that the proﬁt per unit sold is higher. This “cost of quality eﬀect” is also
critical in determining the new equilibrium qualities and prices.
3.2 PP Firm Oﬀers High Quality
We use the superscript h to denote this case. In this case, ﬁrm h knows the type of each consumer,
and hence is willing to price as low as ph
h
(θ) = c
h
if need be.14 The threshold consumer θ
h
obtains
13A description of the technique used to solve for the equilibrium in the no-PP case is contained in the Technical
Appendix.
14Again, for brevity, we suppress the dependence of the optimal price functions ph
h
, ph

on qh , q .
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the same utility from either product.15 If ph
h
(θ
h
) > c

, then ﬁrm  would lower its price for this
consumer, to ensure that he strictly prefers to buy product . Hence, it must be that ph
h
(θ
h
) = c

.
Therefore, this consumer is deﬁned by θ
h
=
c
h
−ph

q
h
−q

. Similarly, θ

is deﬁned by the consumer
indiﬀerent between buying product  and not consuming at all. Hence, θ

=
ph

q

. In contrast to the
low-PP case, when ﬁrm h adopts PP, it charges a price monotonic in consumer valuations.
Proposition 3 Suppose ﬁrms choose any qualities q
h
> q

at stage 1, with associated costs c
h
=
c(q
h
) and c

= c(q

), that satisfy (i) q

< q
h
and (ii) c
h
< q
h
. In the equilibrium of the pricing
subgame starting at stage 2, we have 0 < θ

< θ
h
≤ 1. Further,
(a) the optimal price of ﬁrm  is lower than c
h
, the marginal cost of ﬁrm h. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm  sets
ph

=
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2 (c +
q

q
h
c
h
) if 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
) ≤ 1
min{c
h
− (q
h
− q

), c+q2 } otherwise.
(b) over the market it serves, ﬁrm h charges an optimal price monotonically increasing in consumer
valuations. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm h sets
ph
h
(θ) =
{
c
h
if θ ∈ [0, θ
h
]
1
2(c +
q

q
h
c
h
) + θ(q
h
− q

) if θ ∈ (θ
h
, 1].
Firm h charges a monotonically increasing price because it faces no competitive threat from
ﬁrm  in the region [θ
h
, 1]. Interestingly, ﬁrm ′s price is lower than even the marginal cost of ﬁrm
h, i.e., ph

< c
h
. This pricing policy enables it to serve a sizable segment of the market, despite
being a low quality ﬁrm and not having PP.
Now consider the choice of qualities of stage 1. Incorporating the optimal stage 2 prices leads
to the following proﬁt functions for the ﬁrms:
πh

(q
h
, q

) = (θ
h
− θ

)(ph

− c

) =
(c
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
(3)
πh
h
(q
h
, q

) =
∫ 1
θ
h
(ph
h
(θ)− c
h
)dθ =
(ph

+ q
h
− q

− c
h
)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(4)
In this case, too, the price-competition eﬀect works in the same direction: the ﬁrm that does
not have PP (here, ﬁrm ) reduces its price to compete more eﬀectively. In response to this “price-
competition eﬀect,” ﬁrm h raises its quality. We demonstrate this in Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
15As in the low-PP case, we solve for an interior solution, with 0 < θ < θh < 1. We show in Lemma 3 in the
Appendix that the equilibrium must satisfy this condition.
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Of course, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms change their qualities from the no-PP case. We ﬁrst
demonstrate that, with quadratic costs, both ﬁrms raise their qualities.
Proposition 4 Suppose the cost function is quadratic; that is, c(q) = Aq2. In equilibrium, when
ﬁrm h adopts PP, both ﬁrms raise their qualities, compared to the no-PP case. In particular,
qh
h
= 0.444A and q
h

= 0.222A .
However, this is not true for all degrees of convexity of the cost function. As in the low-PP
case, if the cost function is not too convex (in particular, α ≤ 1.55), ﬁrm  chooses a lower quality
in equilibrium. Conversely, if the cost function is highly convex (α > 1.55), it chooses a higher
quality (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Equilibrium qualities of ﬁrms h (top) and  (bottom) with c(q) = qα.
Thus, for a wide range of α, both ﬁrms increase their qualities compared to the no-PP case.
Here, the market coverage eﬀect beneﬁts ﬁrm h, which can penetrate into the market of ﬁrm .
The competitive response of ﬁrm  takes two dimensions: it reduces its price (the price-competition
eﬀect), and also increases its quality (to come closer to ﬁrm h). This, in turn, induces ﬁrm h to
increase its own quality, to avoid head-to-head competition. As in the low-PP case, if costs are
close to linear (i.e., for low values of α), the ﬁrm without PP moves further away in quality. That
is, ﬁrm  reduces its quality, with a corresponding reduction in price. This results in lower market
coverage, but a higher proﬁt per unit, due to the cost-of-quality eﬀect. Therefore, starting from
the no-PP case, if the cost function is convex enough, the non-PP ﬁrm seeks to reduce quality
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diﬀerentiation and come closer to the PP ﬁrm in the quality space. That is, if the PP ﬁrm has a
low quality, in equilibrium both ﬁrms end up with lower qualities than previously. The converse
outcome occurs if the PP ﬁrm chooses high quality; that is, both ﬁrms end up with higher qualities.
Further, the ﬁrm without PP oﬀers a lower price than the corresponding price in the no-PP case.
3.3 Both Firms have PP
We denote this case with the superscript b. Suppose the ﬁrms choose qualities q
h
and q

at stage 1.
Then, θ
h
= ch−cq
h
−q

, θ

= cq

, and θˆ = chq
h
. Recall that ﬁrm h sells to consumers in the region [θ
h
, 1]
and ﬁrm  in the region [θ

, θ
h
]. As in the low-PP case, θˆ represents the point beyond which ﬁrms
compete for consumers, so that consumers in the region [θ

, θˆ] are not willing to buy good h at any
price c
h
or higher.16
Consider stage 2 of this game, where the ﬁrms choose their price schedule, given qualities q
h
, q

.
Let pb
h
(θ) be the optimal price charged by ﬁrm h to the consumer of type θ. This is the price at
which he is exactly indiﬀerent between buying the low quality product at c

(the lowest price ﬁrm
 is willing to charge) and the high quality product h at pb
h
(θ). Therefore, θq
h
− pb
h
(θ) = θq

− c

,
or pb
h
(θ) = c

+ θ(q
h
− q

). As in the high-PP case, this price is strictly increasing in θ.
Consider the price charged by ﬁrm . The pricing function is similar to the one in the low-PP
case, with the one diﬀerence that ﬁrm h is willing to price as low as c
h
to any consumer. Hence,
the optimal price function for ﬁrm  is pb

(θ) = θq

for θ ∈ [θ

, θˆ] and pb

(θ) = c
h
− θ
h
(q
h
− q

) for
θ ∈ [θˆ, θ
h
]. As before, in the latter region, the price of ﬁrm  is declining in a consumer’s willingness
to pay. Stepping back to stage 1, we incorporate the optimal stage 2 prices into the ﬁrms’ proﬁt
functions to obtain
πb
h
(q
h
, q

) =
∫ 1
θ
h
(c

+ θ(q
h
− q

)− c
h
)dθ =
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(5)
πb

(q
h
, q

) =
∫ θˆ
θ

(θq

− c

)dθ +
∫ θ
h
θˆ
(c
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)− c

)dθ =
(c
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
. (6)
Comparing equations (23) and (12), we observe that the proﬁt function of ﬁrm h, when both ﬁrms
have PP, is exactly the same as in the case when only ﬁrm  has PP. Hence, h′s reaction function in
the two cases is the same as well. Similarly, comparing equations (24) and (18), the proﬁt function
of ﬁrm , when both ﬁrms have PP, is exactly the same as in the case when only ﬁrm h has PP.
16We show in the proof of Proposition 5 that the equilibrium satisﬁes 0 < θ < θh < 1.
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Hence, ′s reaction function in the two cases is the same as well. The analysis of the previous two
cases can now be directly used when both ﬁrms have PP.
We show that when both ﬁrms have PP, both ﬁrms choose a lower quality than when only ﬁrm
h has PP. Notice that this result does not depend on additional restrictions on the cost function.
In comparing the qualities to the case when only ﬁrm  has PP, we ﬁnd that both qualities are
higher when the cost function is convex enough, but lower when the cost function is not too convex.
Numerically, for the function c(q) = qα, when α > 1.3, both qualities are higher than in the low-PP
case. We analytically prove this latter result for the quadratic cost function.
Proposition 5 Consider the case in which both ﬁrms have PP.
(i) In equilibrium, both ﬁrms oﬀer a lower quality than in the case where only ﬁrm h has PP. That
is, qb
h
< qh
h
and qb

< qh

.
(ii) Suppose the cost function is quadratic, so c(q) = Aq2. Then, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms oﬀer a
higher quality than in the case where only ﬁrm  has PP. That is, qb
h
= 0.4A > q

h
and qb

= 0.2A > q


.
When costs are quadratic, compared to the case when neither ﬁrm had PP, in equilibrium the
high quality ﬁrm lowers its quality and the low quality ﬁrm raises its quality. Thus, both ﬁrms
actually come closer to each other in quality. A subtle consequence of both ﬁrms having PP is that
the increase in pricing ﬂexibility levels the playing ﬁeld. Since both ﬁrms can now price at marginal
cost for the threshold customer, the price competition eﬀect leads to intensiﬁed competition for
market share. Further, both have an incentive to compete more aggressively, so the relative product
diﬀerentiation between the two ﬁrms decreases, which in turn increases the market coverage of each
ﬁrm. But, for increasingly convex cost structures, the additional burden of the cost-of-quality eﬀect
leaves both ﬁrms worse oﬀ. The intensiﬁed price competition implies that consumers are better oﬀ.
4 Firm Proﬁts and Consumer Surplus
In this section, we examine which ﬁrms are likely to adopt PP, and the resultant consumer welfare.
Suppose neither ﬁrm has PP. We assume that after one or both ﬁrms adopt PP, the quality rankings
of the ﬁrms do not change. That is, the low quality ﬁrm, when neither ﬁrm had PP, remains the low
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quality ﬁrm when one or both ﬁrms have PP. Quality levels are tantamount to brand equity, and
signiﬁcant changes to quality are likely to be costly. This is especially true when quality rankings
are reversed. By contrast, local or marginal changes to quality can be made in a continuous fashion.
Hence, we now consider ﬁrm  acquiring PP, or ﬁrm h acquiring PP, or both. First, consider the
quadratic cost case, with c(q) = Aq2. In Table 1, we exhibit equilibria under diﬀerent settings for
this case.
Neither ﬁrm has PP Low-PP case High-PP case Both ﬁrms have PP
Firm h  h  h  h 
Quality 0.410/A 0.199/A 0.388/A 0.164/A 0.444/A 0.222/A 0.4/A 0.2/A
Market Coverage 0.279 0.345 0.224 0.612 0.444 0.222 0.4 0.4
Average Price 0.227/A 0.075/A 0.201/A 0.056/A 0.247/A 0.074/A 0.2/A 0.06/A
Proﬁt 0.016/A 0.012/A 0.011/A 0.018/A 0.022/A 0.006/A 0.016/A 0.008/A
Cons. Surplus 0.047/A 0.045/A 0.049/A 0.12/A
Table 1: Summary of equilibrium results when c(q) = Aq2
The consumer surplus shown above is deﬁned in each of the four cases as
CS =
∫ θ
h
θ

(θq

− p

(θ))dθ +
∫ 1
θ
h
(θq
h
− p
h
(θ))dθ,
where p

(θ) and p
h
(θ) are, respectively, the prices paid in equilibrium by a consumer of type θ
buying good  and good h.17 For example, in the case when the PP ﬁrm has low quality, we have
p
h
(θ) = p
h
, which is independent of θ, and p

(θ) = p

(θ), as given in Proposition 1.
Notice that the results in the case when neither ﬁrm has PP correspond exactly to those of
Moorthy (1991). The average price displayed in the table is the average of the prices paid by
diﬀerent consumers for the good. In the case when neither ﬁrm has PP, all consumers pay the same
price. When both ﬁrms have PP, due to the intensiﬁed competition, the average price of both ﬁrms
is the lowest across all cases. Further, the overall market coverage is at its highest. Hence, CS is
maximized in this case.
As Table 1 shows, both ﬁrms have an incentive to adopt PP when costs are quadratic, regardless
of whether the other ﬁrm also has PP. However, the ﬁrms are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: if
both ﬁrms adopt PP, their proﬁts are each lower than in the no-PP case. Even though there is a
market coverage eﬀect which boosts market share, the deleterious impact of the price competition
eﬀect is that the average price of each sale is lower. Further, due to the cost-of-quality eﬀect the
17Since this CS expression applies to each of the four cases, we omit the superscript on prices and qualities.
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proﬁts dip, leaving both ﬁrms worse oﬀ as a result. We summarize the quadratic case as follows.
The proof follows directly by comparison across the columns in Table 1.
Proposition 6 Suppose costs are quadratic, so c(q) = Aq2. Then,
(i) if one ﬁrm alone adopts PP, its proﬁt increases, compared to the case when neither ﬁrm has
PP. However, if both ﬁrms have PP, each ﬁrm has lower proﬁts than in the no-PP case.
(ii) consumer surplus (CS) is highest when both ﬁrms have PP. Further, it is higher when only ﬁrm
h has PP, compared to the cases when either ﬁrm  alone or neither ﬁrm has PP.
Next, consider the case c(q) = qα, where α > 1. As before, we numerically compare equilibria
across the diﬀerent cases. We ﬁnd that consumer surplus remains highest in the case when both
ﬁrms have PP. This points out the beneﬁts of competition when there is perfect price discrimination,
in contrast to the scenario where there is only a monopolist, which results in zero CS.18
Observation 1 For all α > 1, consumer surplus is higher when both ﬁrms have PP, as compared
to any of the other cases.
When both ﬁrms have PP, ﬁrm h charges a price pb
h
(θ) = c

+ θ(q
h
− q

) to its consumers.
Compare this to the price it charges when ﬁrm  does not have PP: ph
h
(θ) = ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

). If
ﬁrm  now adopts PP, the greater competition leads to a lower price for consumers of ﬁrm h, and
a corresponding increase in welfare. Consumer surplus (CS) falls, compared to the no personalized
pricing case, if the PP ﬁrm has low quality, but rises if the PP ﬁrm has high quality. When ﬁrm 
has PP, it extends its market reach to a segment previously untapped, since it can price as low as
marginal cost. However, a segment of ﬁrm ′s consumers receive no surplus, since they pay a price
exactly equal to their willingness to pay. Conversely, if ﬁrm h has PP, it faces competition from
ﬁrm  throughout its market segment, and is forced to concede some surplus to consumers.
Observation 2 For α ∈ [1, 4], it is a dominant strategy for ﬁrm  to adopt PP. That is, regardless
of whether ﬁrm h has PP, ﬁrm  should adopt PP.
Figure 4 demonstrates the increase in proﬁt to ﬁrm  when it adopts PP. The ﬁgure on the
18Bhaskar and To (2002) obtain similar results in their framework.
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left illustrates the case of neither ﬁrm having PP, and the ﬁgure on the right, the case of ﬁrm h
having PP. We emphasize that the cost of acquiring a resource to enable personalized pricing is not
factored into this calculation. Such a cost can be incorporated as follows. The vertical gap between
the dashed and solid line indicates the gain to ﬁrm  from PP. It will adopt PP if and only if this
gap exceeds the ﬁxed cost of adopting PP.
Figure 4: Proﬁt of Firm  when Firm h does not (left) and does (right) have PP
Observation 3 Regardless of whether ﬁrm  has PP, ﬁrm h should adopt PP only if the cost
function is not too convex. In particular, there exists an αˆ ∈ [2.5, 3] such that, if α > αˆ, and ﬁrm
h adopts PP, its proﬁts decrease.
Figure 5 demonstrates this result. How can the proﬁt of ﬁrm h decrease when it adopts PP?
Recall that, when ﬁrm h adopts PP and ﬁrm  does not have PP, ﬁrm  responds by reducing its
price. This induces ﬁrm h to increase its quality. Increasing quality is especially costly when the
cost function is steep; indeed, it is costly enough in this case to outweigh the beneﬁts of charging
consumers according to their willingness to pay. A similar intuition holds when ﬁrm  has PP. If
ﬁrm h adopts PP in this situation, the new equilibrium sees both ﬁrms at a higher quality, which
is correspondingly costly for ﬁrm h. Again, note that this result does not factor in a cost for
implementing PP. With such a cost, ﬁrm h has even less incentive to adopt PP. Together, these
results imply the following.
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Figure 5: Proﬁt of Firm h when Firm  does not (left) and does (right) have PP
Observation 4 Personalized Pricing by both ﬁrms need not lead to a prisoner’s dilemma situation
in which all ﬁrms are worse oﬀ. If both ﬁrms adopt PP, then, for a lower level of convexity of
the cost function, both ﬁrms have higher proﬁts compared to the case when neither ﬁrm has PP.
However, the market shares increase for both ﬁrms, for all α.
The result on proﬁts can be seen by comparing the proﬁts of the two ﬁrms in Figures 4 and
5, between the cases “Neither ﬁrm has PP” and “Both ﬁrms have PP.” PP increases the pricing
ﬂexibility of both ﬁrms. An obvious consequence of this is more intense price competition. However,
since the ﬁrms also respond by strategically changing qualities, the cost-of-quality eﬀect plays a
crucial role in determining the net change in proﬁts. This ensures that personalized pricing does
not invariably lead to a prisoner’s dilemma.
5 Managerial Implications and Conclusion
The practice of personalized pricing is important in both oﬄine and online channels. Our results
show that an appropriate pricing strategy must take into account both consumers’ willingness
to pay and competition in a particular market segment. Ignoring either one can result in lower
proﬁts. In our model, if the low quality ﬁrm deploys PP, it is optimal for it to use a non-monotonic
price schedule. Thus, some high valuation consumers are charged lower prices than some lower
valuation consumers. An example of such pricing comes from the hardware industry for RISC/NT
servers and high end workstations wherein, it is quite common to charge diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent
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customers, for the same quality and same quantity. Large customers are able to extract huge
discounts, despite valuing the product very highly. On the other hand, smaller enterprises obtain
lower discounts because no other ﬁrm competes for their demand (since the proﬁt margins are much
lower). In the latter segment, manufacturers often price according to the customers’ willingness
to pay and in the process, capture most of their surplus. Consequently, they are able to extract
higher proﬁts from some under-contested customers. Conversely, their margins are also squeezed
by some large customers who play the ﬁrms against each other and win price concessions.
Our model also sheds light on the diﬀerent product quality choices made by ﬁrms, given that
one or both ﬁrms implement PP. When a low quality ﬁrm adopts PP, both ﬁrms reduce their
quality levels in equilibrium. In the IT hardware industry, this is often done through stripping oﬀ
some value-added customer service, such as next-day on-site repair versus same-day 8-hour repair,
or a 99%-uptime guarantee versus 99.95%.19 Conversely, if the high quality ﬁrm adopts PP, both
ﬁrms should augment the quality levels of their oﬀerings by providing additional product features
or services. For instance, HP diﬀerentiates itself by providing higher quality, new generation web-
based applications, as well as clustering and security management software embedded in the same
hardware box.20
The critical issue for managers in vertically diﬀerentiated industries to keep in mind in adopting
PP is the interplay between two countervailing eﬀects: increased market coverage and intensiﬁed
competition, given the convexity of the cost function. The increase in market coverage makes PP
attractive. However, aggravated price competition hurts ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Further, optimal qualities
of ﬁrms change. Therefore, the net eﬀect of PP also depends on the nature of the cost function.
For a lower level of convexity of the cost function, both ﬁrms have higher proﬁts compared to
the case when neither ﬁrm has PP and hence, are able to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma situation.
With moderately convex costs, α ∈ [1.5, 3], both low and high quality ﬁrms have an incentive to
adopt PP, regardless of the other ﬁrm’s actions. However, both ﬁrms are better oﬀ in the scenario
where neither has PP, as compared to both having PP, resulting in a prisoner’s dilemma situation.
Conversely, if α > 3, only the low quality ﬁrm will adopt PP, since the high quality ﬁrm reduces
its own proﬁt by adopting PP.
19The cost diﬀerence to the consumer between, say, a 99%-uptime guarantee and a 99.95% guarantee is substantial,
so this diﬀerence is non-trivial.
20See http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/execteam/speeches/ﬁorina/oracleapps 02.html.
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Finally, our model also demonstrates that consumers would beneﬁt if higher quality ﬁrms adopt
PP. In the event that all ﬁrms adopt PP, consumers would beneﬁt the most. Thus we conclude
that, in a competitive scenario, increasing knowledge about consumers’ willingness to pay should
eventually lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare.
One limitation of our paper is that we only consider a single product oﬀering by each ﬁrm,
whereas in practice ﬁrms often oﬀer multiple products. In the extreme case, one can conceive of
ﬁrms oﬀering a personalized quality to each consumer, in addition to a personalized price. If both
ﬁrms have the ability to customize product quality at no additional cost, Bertrand competition
for each consumer is inevitable, and both ﬁrms will be held to zero proﬁt. Hence, a proper study
of customization must therefore incorporate additional features not considered in our model, such
as horizontal diﬀerentiation (Ulph and Vulkan, 2002) or diﬀerences in the customization ability of
ﬁrms (Dellaert and Syam, 2002).
References
[1] Acquisti, A. and H. Varian (2002), “Conditioning Prices on Purchase History,” Working Paper,
University of California at Berkeley.
[2] Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers (2001), “Competitive price discrimination,” Rand Journal of
Economics 32(4): 579–605.
[3] Aron, R., A. Sunderarajan and S. Viswanathan (2003), “Intelligent Agents in Electronic Mar-
kets for Information Goods: Customization, Preference Revelation and Pricing,” Working
Paper, New York University.
[4] Bhaskar, V. and T. To (2002), “Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Eﬃcient? An Analysis
of Free Entry,” Working Paper, University of Essex.
[5] Chen, Y., C. Narasimhan and Z. Zhang (2001), “Individual Marketing with Imperfect Infor-
mation,” Marketing Science 20(1): 23–41.
[6] Chen, Y. and G. Iyer (2002), “Consumer Addressability and Customized Pricing,” Marketing
Science 21(2): 197–208.
[7] Dellaert, B. and N. Syam (2002), “Consumer-Producer Interaction: A Strategic Analysis of
the Market for Customized Products,” Review Of Marketing Science Working Papers Vol. 1:
No. 1, Working Paper 1. http://www.bepress.com/roms/vol1/iss1/paper1
[8] Desai, P. (2001), “Quality Segmentation in Spatial Markets: When Does Cannibalization
Aﬀect Product Line Design?,” Marketing Science 20(3): 265-283.
[9] Gabszewicz, J. and J. Thisse (1986), “On the Nature of Competition with Diﬀerentiated
Products,” The Economic Journal 96: 160–172.
20
[10] Lal, R. and M. Sarvary (1999),“When and How is the Internet Likely to Decrease Price Com-
petition?” Marketing Science 18: 485-?503.
[11] Moorthy, K. (1988), “Product and Price Competition in a Duopoly,” Marketing Science 7(2):
141–168.
[12] Moorthy, K. (1991), “Erratum to: Product and Price Competition in a Duopoly,” Marketing
Science 10(3): 270.
[13] Motta, M. (1993),“ Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition,” Journal of
Industrial Economics 41, 113–131.
[14] Mussa, M. and S. Rosen (1978), “Monopoly and Product Quality,” Journal of Economic
Theory 18: 301–317.
[15] Nagle, T. (2002), “Managing Price Competition,” Marketing Management 2(1): 36–45.
[16] Shaﬀer, G. and Z. Zhang (1995), “Competitive Coupon Targeting ,” Marketing Science 14:
395–416.
[17] Shaﬀer, G. and Z. Zhang (2002), “Competitive One-One Promotions”, Management Science
48:9 1143–1160.
[18] Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), “Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Diﬀerentia-
tion,” Review of Economic Studies 49(1): 3–13.
[19] Smith, G. and T. Nagle (2002), “How much are customers willing to pay?” Marketing Research
14(4): 20–25.
[20] Thisse, J. and X. Vives (1988), “On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy,” American
Economic Review 78(1): 122–137.
[21] Ulph, D. and N. Vulkan (2002), “E-Commerce, Mass Customisation and Price Discrimination,”
Working Paper, ESRC Center, London, U.K.
[22] Villas-Boas, Miguel J. (1999), “Dynamic Competition with Customer Recognition,” Rand
Journal of Economics 30: 604–631.
[23] Wertenbroch, K. and B. Skiera (2002), “Measuring Consumers’ Willingness to Pay at the Point
of Purchase,” Journal of Marketing Research 39(2): 228–241.
[24] Zettelmeyer, F. (2000), “Expanding to the Internet: Pricing and Communication Strategies
When Firms Compete on Multiple Channels,” Journal of Marketing Research 37(3): 292–308.
[25] Zhang, J. (2003) “The Hidden Dangers and Payoﬀs of Targeted Pricing,” Wharton Knowledge
Center, 03/26/2003.
6 Appendix
Guide to Notation
21
Variable Interpretation
Firm h, Firm  High quality and Low quality ﬁrm, respectively.
q
h
, q

Generic qualities of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , respectively.
c
h
, c

Costs of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , at respective qualities q
h
and q

.
θ
h
, θ

Generic market coverage cut-oﬀs of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , respectively.
pn
h
, pn

Optimal price functions of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , when neither ﬁrm has PP.
p
h
, p

(θ) Optimal price functions of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , when PP ﬁrm has low quality.
ph
h
(θ), ph

Optimal price functions of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , when PP ﬁrm has high quality.
pb
h
(θ), pb

(θ) Optimal price functions of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , when both ﬁrms have PP.
qn
h
, qn

Equilibrium qualities of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , when neither ﬁrm has PP.
q
h
, q

Equilibrium qualities of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , when PP ﬁrm has low quality.
qh
h
, qh

Equilibrium qualities of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , when PP ﬁrm has high quality.
qb
h
, qb

Equilibrium qualities of ﬁrm h and ﬁrm , when both ﬁrms have PP.
πn
h
, πn

Proﬁt functions of ﬁrms h and , when neither ﬁrm has PP.
π
h
, π

Proﬁt functions of ﬁrms h and , when PP ﬁrm has low quality.
πh
h
, πh

Proﬁt functions of ﬁrms h and , when PP ﬁrm has high quality.
πb
h
, πb

Proﬁt functions of ﬁrms h and , when both ﬁrms have PP ﬁrm.
Table 2: Guide to Notation
6.1 Neither Firm has PP
We brieﬂy exhibit the closed form expressions for prices and proﬁts when neither ﬁrm has PP.
These expressions are used to numerically solve the model with the cost function c(q) = qα, with
α varying.
Suppose the ﬁrms have chosen qualities q
h
, q

at the ﬁrst stage. Consider the optimal price
functions at the second stage. Assume that the constraints 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1 are satisﬁed (in
equilibrium, these constraints are satisﬁed numerically in the solutions we exhibit for all α > 1).
As Moorthy (1988) has shown, here θ
h
is deﬁned by the consumer exactly indiﬀerent between
products h and , and is given by θ
h
q
h
− pn
h
= θ
h
q

− pn

, so θ
h
=
pn
h
−pn

q
h
−q

. Similarly, θ

is deﬁned by
the consumer indiﬀerent between product  and not consuming at all, which yields θ

=
pn

q

.
Now, the proﬁt of ﬁrm h is π
h
= (1 − p
n
h
−pn

q
h
−q

)(pn
h
− c
h
). Diﬀerentiating with respect to p
h
and
setting the derivative equal to zero, we have 2pn
h
− pn

= q
h
− q

+ c
h
. The second derivative is
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−2
q
h
−q

< 0, so we have a maximum.
Similarly, the proﬁt of ﬁrm  is π

= (
pn
h
−pn

q
h
−q

− p
n

q

) (pn

− c

). Diﬀerentiating with respect to p

and setting the derivative equal to zero, we have −pn
h
q

+2pn

q
h
= c

q
h
. The second order condition
for maximization is satisﬁed as −2qhq
h
−q

< 0. The optimal price functions at stage 2, (pn
h
, pn

), are
found by simultaneously solving the two ﬁrst-order conditions, which yields
pn
h
=
q
h
(2(q
h
− q

) + c

+ 2c
h
)
4q
h
− q

. (7)
pn

=
q
h
(q

+ 2c

) + q

(c
h
− q

)
4q
h
− q

. (8)
From these prices the proﬁt functions can be derived and are given by
πn
h
(q
h
, q

) =
c
h
(−2q
h
+ q

) + q
h
(2q
h
− 2q

+ c

)2
(q
h
− q

)(4q
h
− q

)2
. (9)
πn

(q
h
, q

) =
q
h
(
q

(q
h
− q

+ c
h
) + (c

(−2q
h
+ q

)2)
)
q

(q
h
− q

)(4q
h
− q

)2
. (10)
Now, the equilibrium qualities at stage 1 are solved for in the usual way; diﬀerentiating each
proﬁt function with respect to the quality of that ﬁrm yields a reaction function, and the equilibrium
qualities must simultaneously satisfy both reaction functions.
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6.2 PP Firm Oﬀers Low Quality
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose ﬁrms have chosen qualities q
h
, q

at stage 1 that satisfy q

< q
h
and c
h
< q
h
, where
c
h
= c(q
h
) and c

= c(q

). Consider the pricing subgame that starts at stage 2.
Firm  will set its price for each consumer, p

(θ), as high as possible to satisfy two restrictions:
(i) the consumer buys product  instead of product h, and (ii) the consumer buys product , rather
than not consume at all. These conditions imply
θq

− p

(θ) ≥ θq
h
− p
h
or p

(θ) ≤ p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)
θq

− p

(θ) ≥ 0, or p

(θ) ≤ θq

.
Further, ﬁrm  must set p

(θ) ≥ c

= c

(q

) for each consumer, or else it makes a loss on
that consumer, and would prefer not to sell to him. Hence, we have p

(θ) ≥ c

, and p

(θ) ≤
min{θq

, p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)}. In the second inequality, p

(θ) ≤ θq

follows from the fact that the
consumer’s reservation utility is zero. Further, p

(θ) < p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

) can be interpreted as an
incentive compatibility constraint for the consumer: if this is violated, he buys product h instead.
By deﬁnition, θ
h
= min{p

h
−c

q
h
−q

, 1}. Hence, the proﬁt of ﬁrm h, if it charges price p
h
, is
π
h
= (1−θ
h
) (p
h
−c
h
) = (1− p

h
−c

q
h
−q

) (p
h
−c
h
). First, suppose that θ
h
< 1. The ﬁrst-order condition
for proﬁt-maximization, ∂πh
∂p
h
= 0, directly yields its optimal price p
h
= 12 (qh − q + ch + c). Given
this price for ﬁrm h, we have θ
h
= min{p

h
−c

q
h
−q

, 1} = min{ qh−q+ch−c2(q
h
−q

) , 1}. Clearly, θh > 0.
Further, θ
h
< 1 if and only if c
h
− c

< q
h
− q

. In this case, all conditions for proﬁt-maximization
by ﬁrm h are satisﬁed (the second derivative of the proﬁt function is easily checked), and we can
ignore the boundary conditions on θ
h
.
Suppose, instead, that c
h
− c

≥ q
h
− q

. Then, if ﬁrm h continues to price at p
h
= 12 (qh − q +
c
h
+ c

), we have p
h
≤ c
h
and θ
h
= 1. Since θ
h
= 1, ﬁrm h has no sales, so its proﬁts are zero. As
long as θ
h
= 1, any price charged by ﬁrm h remains a best response. From this set of prices, we
set p
h
= c
h
, the marginal cost of ﬁrm h. Note that at this price, the condition θ
h
= 1 is satisﬁed,
since c
h
− c

≥ q
h
− q

.
Now, consider θˆ =
p
h
q
h
. Given the price postulated for ﬁrm h, and that c
h
< q
h
(by assumption),
it is immediate that θˆ < 1. Further, p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

) > θq

for θ > θˆ, and p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

) < θq

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for θ < θˆ. The pricing function for ﬁrm  now follows for consumers in the range θ ∈ [θ

, θ
h
].
Consumers outside this range are unwilling to purchase product  even at the price c

; to these
consumers, ﬁrm  charges a price equal to c

.
We have already shown that θ
h
≤ 1. Now θ

= cq

, and since c
h
< q
h
, it must be that c

< q

(by convexity of the cost function c(·)). Hence, 0 < θ

< 1. Finally, we need to show that θ

< θ
h
.
If θ
h
= 1, this is immediate. Hence, suppose that θ
h
< 1; as shown earlier, this can happen only if
c
h
− c

< q
h
− q

. In this case, θ
h
= qh−q+ch−c2(q
h
−q

) .
Now, convexity of the cost function implies that ch−cq
h
−q

>
c

q

when q
h
> q

. Hence,
1 +
c
h
− c

q
h
− q

>
c

q

+
c

q

q
h
− q

+ c
h
− c

q
h
− q

> 2
c

q

θ
h
=
q
h
− q

+ c
h
− c

2(q
h
− q

)
>
c

q

= θ

.
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium of the whole game, 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1.
Proof: Suppose ﬁrms have chosen their equilibrium quality levels at period 1. Then, it cannot be
that q

= q
h
= 0 (since at least one ﬁrm would choose a positive quality and earn a positive proﬁt).
Without loss of generality, assume q
h
> 0 and c
h
< q
h
. Then there exists a q

∈ (0, q
h
) such that
ﬁrm  earns a positive proﬁt. From Proposition 1, it follows that 0 < θ

< θ
h
≤ 1.
Now, we show that θ
h
< 1 in the equilibrium of the whole game. The argument runs as follows.
We show that, in equilibrium, c′(q

) < 1. This will imply that there exists a q
h
such that ﬁrm h
makes a positive proﬁt, which further implies that θ
h
< 1 (since ﬁrm h earns a zero proﬁt if θ
h
= 1).
Let c′

denote c′(q

). Suppose c′

≥ 1. Also, suppose that θ
h
= 1. Then, from Proposition 1, it
must be that c
h
− c

≥ q
h
− q

. Suppose ﬁrst that ch−cqh−q = 1. Then, given its pricing scheme, the
revenue of ﬁrm  is obtained as the area of the triangle in Figure 2. As shown, the price of ﬁrm 
is linear in q. Hence, its average price pˆ =
∫ θh
θ
p

(θ)dθ is also linear in . Further, since only the
consumer with θ = 1 is willing to pay q

, we can write this average price as pˆ = βq

, where β < 1.
Now, the proﬁt of ﬁrm  can be written as π = (θh− θ)(βq− c(q)). Consider a small change
in q. The second term (βq − c(q)) denotes the proﬁt per unit sold; this increases when q falls,
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since its derivative is β − c

, where β < 1 ≤ c′

.
Consider the ﬁrst term, which denotes the market coverage. θ = cq , which falls when q falls.
Also, since θh = ch−cqh−q , we have
∂θh
∂q
= ch−c−c
′
(qh−q)
(qh−q)2 =
1−c′
qh−q since ch −c = qh −q . Hence
∂θh
∂q
≤ 0
when c′ ≥ 1. That is, if q falls slightly, ﬁrm  still sells all the way up to θ = 1. So, if q falls, both
terms in π increase. Hence, it cannot be that θh = 1 and c′(q) ≥ 1.
Finally, if ch−cqh−q > 1, it follows even more strongly that c
′(q

) < 1, since the market coverage of
ﬁrm  improves, and its proﬁt per unit also improves.
Hence, it must be that c′

< 1. Now, suppose ﬁrm h chooses a quality q

+ . For  > 0 small
enough, c
h
− c

≈ c′

 < q
h
− q

= . Hence, there exists an  > 0 such that c
h
− c

< q
h
− q

, which
implies p
h
> c
h
. Substituting the value of p
h
= qh−q+ch+c2 , we have p

h
= 12(1 +
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

), which
implies θ
h
< 1. Hence, there exists a q
h
such that ﬁrm h makes a positive proﬁt. Hence, it will
never choose a q
h
such that θ
h
= 1.
Therefore, in the equilibrium of the whole game, 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1.
6.2.1 Derivation of Reaction Functions
We show (as an aside; this is used in Proof of Proposition 5) that the reaction functions are upward
sloping.
Lemma 2 (i) The reaction functions of both ﬁrms are upward-sloping in the range of quality such
that c′(q

) < 1.
(ii) Suppose both ﬁrms oﬀer the no-PP qualities, qn
h
, qn

, and ﬁrm  now adopts PP. Then, compared
to the no-PP case: (a) if ﬁrms remain at their original qualities, qn
h
, qn

, the optimal defensive
strategy of ﬁrm h is to charge a lower price (b) Compared to the no-PP case, if ﬁrm h remains at
its original quality, qn
h
, then the optimal strategy of ﬁrm  is to lower its quality.
Proof of Lemma 2
(i) We ﬁrst derive the reaction functions of the two ﬁrms. As shown in equations (1) and (2) of the
text, the proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms in this case are
π

(q
h
, q

) =
∫ θˆ
θ

(θq

− c

)dθ +
∫ θ
h
θˆ
(p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)− c

)dθ =
(p
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)q
h
q

(11)
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π
h
(q
h
, q

) = (p
h
− c
h
) (1− θ
h
(p
h
, q
h
, c

, q

)) =
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(12)
We focus on an interior equilibrium with 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1. We restrict attention to qualities
such that c′(q

) < 1 because we have shown that the equilibrium qualities satisfy this restriction.
The reaction functions are valid for all qualities in this range: as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, if
c′(q

) < 1, there exist qualities q
h
at which ﬁrm h can earn a positive proﬁt (and therefore θ
h
< 1).
The ﬁrst-order condition of ﬁrm  is
∂π

∂q

= 0. Recognizing that the optimal price of ﬁrm h, p
h
,
is a function of q

(from Proposition 1), we have
(p
h
q

− c

q
h
)(c

q
h
(q
h
− 2q

) + q

(p
h
q
h
− (q
h
− q

)(2c′

q
h
+ q

− c′

q

)))
2(q
h
− q

)2 q

2 q
h
= 0. (13)
Since p
h
> c
h
, and q
h
> q

=⇒ chq
h
>
c

q

(since c(·) is convex), the optimal quality q

is given by
the solution to
c

q
h
(q
h
− 2q

) + q

(p
h
q
h
− (q
h
− q

)(2c′

q
h
+ q

− c′

q

)) = 0. (14)
The solution to this equation yields the reaction function of ﬁrm , denoted r

(q
h
).
The corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm h is
∂π
h
∂q
h
= 0, or
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)(q
h
− q

+ c
h
− c

− 2(q
h
− q

)c′
h
)
4(q
h
− q

)2 q

2
= 0. (15)
Since q
h
> q

, it cannot be that (q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

) = 0. Hence, the optimal quality of ﬁrm h, q
h
is
given by the solution to
q
h
− q

+ c
h
− c

− 2(q
h
− q

)c′
h
= 0. (16)
Let r
h
(q

), the solution to this equation, denote the reaction function for ﬁrm h.
Now, let ψ denote the left-hand side of equation (13), and ψh the left-hand side of equation
(15). We have
∂ψ
∂q
h
=
(c′

− 1)(c
h
+ c

− c′
h
q
h
)
4q
h
2
+
(c
h
− c

)(c′
h
+ c′

)
4(q
h
− q

)
− (ch − c)
2
4(q
h
− q

)3
− (c
′
h
c′

)
(q
h
− q

)
+
(q

− c′

q

)
4q
h
2
.
Now, the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth terms sum to
(c′

−1)(c
h
+c

−c′
h
q
h
−q

)
q
h
2 > 0, since c′ < 1 (as argued in Step
2 above) c′
h
>
c
h
q
h
(by convexity of c(·), and c

< q

(else ﬁrm  has zero sales). Adding the second,
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third and fourth terms, and simplifying, we have
((c
h
− c

)− c′

(q
h
− q

))(−(c
h
− c

) + c′
h
(q
h
− q

))
4(q
h
− q

)3
.
Now, convexity of c(·) implies that c
h
> c

+ c′

(q
h
− q

), and c

> c
h
− c′
h
(q
h
− q

). Hence, this
expression is also positive. Therefore, ∂ψ∂q
h
> 0. Now, suppose ﬁrm  has chosen an optimal quality,
and ﬁrm h now increases q
h
. Then, at the original optimal quality of ﬁrm , ψ > 0. Hence, to
reach ψ = 0, ﬁrm  must increase its quality. Hence, its reaction function, r , is upward-sloping.
Next, consider ψh(qh , q). We have
∂ψh
∂q

=
(c
h
− c

− c′

(q
h
− q

))(c′
h
(q
h
− q

) + c

− c
h
)
2(q
h
− q

)3
.
Convexity of c(·) directly implies c
h
> c

+ c′

(q
h
− q

) and c′
h
>
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

. Hence, ∂ψh∂q

> 0. Now,
suppose ﬁrm h has chosen an optimal quality, and ﬁrm  now increases q

. Then, at the original
optimal quality of ﬁrm h, ψh(qh , q) > 0. Hence, to reach ψh = 0, ﬁrm h must increase its quality.
Hence, its reaction function, r
h
, is upward-sloping.
(ii) (a) Suppose both ﬁrms choose the same quality levels as in the no-PP case; that is, q
h
= qn
h
and q

= qn

. Given pn
h
from equation (7) and p
h
= 12 (qh − q + ch + c) from Proposition 1, we
have p
h
< pn
h
if and only if 12(qh − q + ch + c) <
2q
h
c
h
+q
h
c

−2q
h
q

+2q
h
2
(4q
h
−q

) . Cross-multiplying and
simplifying, this condition holds if and only if (q
h
c

− q

c
h
) + (c

− q

)(q
h
− q

) < 0. Now, q
h
> q

,
and c

≤ q

(or else ﬁrm  sells zero units). Further, since c(·) is convex, chq
h
>
c

q

, so q
h
c

−q

c
h
< 0.
Hence, p
h
< pn
h
.
(ii) (b) Consider ψ, the left-hand side of equation (13). Then,
∂ψ
∂p
h
=
1−c′

2q
h
+
c
h
−c

−c′

(q
h
−q

)
2(q
h
−q

)2
. The
argument in Step 2 of Lemma 1 is easily extended to show c′

< 1 in equilibrium. Hence, the ﬁrst
term above is positive. Since c(·) is convex, c
h
> c

+c′

(q
h
−q

), so the second term is also positive.
Thus ∂ψ
∂p
h
> 0.
Now, suppose the ﬁrms choose their no-PP quality levels, qn
h
, qn

. If ﬁrm h keeps its quality level
at qn
h
and reduces its price from pn
h
to p
h
, we will have ψ > 0. Hence, ﬁrm  must reduce its quality
to ensure that ψ = 0.
6.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Moorthy (1991) provides the equilibrium for the no-PP case with quadratic costs; the qualities here
are qn
h
= 0.4098A and q
n

= 0.199A .
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Consider the case in which only ﬁrm  has PP. In Lemma 2, we demonstrate the reaction
functions for a general cost function. Substituting c(q) = Aq2, the proﬁt-maximization condition
for the high quality ﬁrm, equation (15), reduces to (q
h
−q

)(1+Aq

−3Aq
h
) = 0, so q
h
= q3 +
1
3A (since
q
h
= q

is obviously not proﬁt-maximizing). The corresponding condition for ﬁrm , equation (13),
is (1+A(q
h
−q

))(q
h
−2q

+A(q
h
−4q

)(q
h
−q

)) = 0. Again, the reaction function is given by setting
the second term to zero (since the ﬁrst is always positive when q
h
> q

). Simultaneously solving
the two reaction functions, we obtain q
h
= 0.388A and q


= 0.164A , both lower than the corresponding
qualities in the no-PP case. It is immediate to check that the constraints 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1 are
satisﬁed.
Finally, we show that neither ﬁrm wants to leapfrog; that is, ﬁrm h does not want to choose a
quality lower than that of ﬁrm , and vice versa.
For convenience, call the ﬁrms 1 and 2 at this stage. Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses q1 = 0.388A , and ﬁrm
2 chooses q2 = 0.164A in equilibrium. Note that ﬁrm 2 has PP, and ﬁrm 1 does not. In equilibrium,
ﬁrm 1 is the high quality ﬁrm. However, we wish to rule out the following deviations:
(i) ﬁrm 1 chooses some q1 < 0.164A , and becomes a lower quality ﬁrm.
(ii) ﬁrm 2 chooses some q2 > 0.388A , and becomes a higher quality ﬁrm.
Consider (i) ﬁrst. Suppose ﬁrm 2 chooses q2 = 0.164A , and ﬁrm 1 does leapfrog, and chooses
q1 <
0.164
A . In particular, let the optimal quality of ﬁrm 1, given that it has lower quality than ﬁrm
2, be denoted q1 = 0.164−A , where  ≥ 0.
Note that ﬁrm 1 does not have PP, and ﬁrm 2 does. In the conjectured deviation, ﬁrm 1 has
lower quality. Hence, its proﬁt function is given by equation (3) of the text (that is, its proﬁt is
the same as that of the low quality ﬁrm, when only the high quality ﬁrm has PP). Replacing the
cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2, we get
π1(qh , q) =
A2(q
h
− q

)q
h
q

2
.
Note that, in the conjectured deviation, we have q
h
= q2 = 0.164A , and q = q1 =
0.164−
A . Substituting
these into the proﬁt function, we have
π1() =
(0.0138− 0.082)
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.082. Then, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is 0.0005A . The
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equilibrium proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is easily computed to be 0.011A (this is reported in Table 1 on page 14 of
the paper). Hence, there is no incentive for the high quality ﬁrm to deviate and become the lower
quality ﬁrm.
Now, consider case (ii). Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses quality q1 = 0.388A . Suppose that ﬁrm 2 deviates
to some quality higher than this, and becomes the higher quality ﬁrm. Let the new (after deviation)
quality level for the ﬁrm 2 be q2 = 0.388+A . Since ﬁrm 2 has PP, and is now (after the deviation) the
higher quality ﬁrm, its proﬁt function for ﬁrm 2 is given by equation (4) in the text of the paper.
Replacing the optimal price ph

of the other ﬁrm, and cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2 and
then simplifying, we get
π2(qh , q) =
(Aq
h
2(q

− 2q
h
) + q
h
(2q
h
− 2q

+ Aq

2))2
8q
h
2(q
h
− q

)
=
(q
h
− q

)(2−A(2q
h
+ q

)2
8
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.388+A and q = q1 =
0.388
A , we have
π2() =
0.125(0.836− 2)2
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.139. Then, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 is 0.005A . This is less
than its proﬁts at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.018A (see Table 1). Hence, there is no incentive
for the low quality ﬁrm to deviate and become the higher quality ﬁrm.
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6.3 PP Firm Oﬀers High Quality
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose ﬁrm  chooses a price ph

. Then, consumers with θ ≥ p
h

q

receive a non-negative utility
from product . For θ in this range, a consumer with type θ receives utility θq

−p
h
. Given the price
of ﬁrm , the best response of ﬁrm h for each θ is the maximum price ph
h
at which the consumer
obtains a weakly higher utility from product h than from (i) buying product  and (ii) not buying
the product at all. The ﬁrst requirement yields θq
h
− ph
h
(θ) ≥ θq

− ph

, or ph
h
(θ) ≤ ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

).
The second one yields θq
h
− ph
h
(θ) ≥ 0, or ph
h
(θ) ≤ θq
h
. Further, we require that ph
h
(θ) ≥ c
h
for
all θ (so that ﬁrm h never exposes itself to a loss). Putting all these together, and recalling that
θ =
ph

q

, for any ph

, the best response of ﬁrm h is: for each θ ∈ [0, 1],
ph
h
(θ) =
{
max{ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

), c
h
} if θ ≥ θ
max{θq
h
, c
h
} otherwise. (17)
Now, suppose ﬁrm  charges a price ph

. Given the best response of ﬁrm h, what part of the
market can it cover? First, note that if ph

> q

, ﬁrm  makes no sales; the consumer with the
highest valuation for the good (with θ = 1) is unwilling to purchase good . Hence, we restrict
attention to prices for ﬁrm  that satisfy ph

< q

. This immediately implies that θ < 1.
Clearly, ﬁrm  has no sales in the region [0, θ), where θ =
ph

q
h
. Suppose θ ≥ chq
h
. This
implies that ph

≥ chq
h
q

. If a consumer with θ ∈ [θ, 1] buys product , her consumer surplus is
θq

− ph

≤ q

(θ − chq
h
). Firm h’s best response is to choose ph
h
(θ) to match this surplus. Then, ﬁrm
h will win over all consumers in the range [θ, 1], leaving ﬁrm  with no sales.
Hence, in the equilibrium of the pricing subgame, it must be that θ <
c
h
q
h
. From equation (17),
this implies that, for consumers in the range [0, θ], the best response of ﬁrm h is ch . Consumers
in the range [θ, 1] are charged phh(θ) = max{ph + θ(qh − q) ch}. For now, suppose phh(θ) =
ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

). We show later that, given the optimal price of ﬁrm , such a pricing policy satisﬁes
ph
h
(θ) ≥ c
h
for all θ ≥ θ.
Then, θ
h
= min{ ch−p

h
q
h
−q

, 1}. There are therefore two cases to consider.
Case 1 : Suppose
c
h
−p
h
q
h
−q

≤ 1, so that θ
h
=
c
h
−p
h
q
h
−q

. Then, the proﬁt of ﬁrm from the ﬁrst-order con-
dition  can be written as π

= (ph

−c

)(θ
h
−θ

). The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt-maximization,
∂π

∂p

= 0, directly yields ﬁrm ’s optimal price function, ph

= 12 (c +
c
h
q
h
q

). Since q

< q
h
and
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c

< c
h
, it follows that ph

< c
h
, so that the price of ﬁrm  is lower than the marginal cost of ﬁrm h.
Note also that from the convexity of c(·), it follows that chq
h
>
c

q

and it follows immediately that
ph

> c

.
Now, the optimal price of ﬁrm h for consumers in the range [θ, 1] is phh(θ) = max{ph + θ(qh −
q

) , c
h
}. Given ph

, we have θ
h
= min{ ch−p
h

q
h
−q

, 1} = min{12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
), 1}. Clearly, θ
h
> 0. If, in
addition 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
) ≤ 1, we have θ
h
≤ 1. In this case, the best response of ﬁrm h is to price
at ph
h
(θ) = c
h
for θ ∈ [0, θ
h
] and at ph
h
(θ) = ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

) for θ ∈ (θ
h
, 1].
Case 2 : Suppose
c
h
−ph

q
h
−q

> 1, so that θ
h
= 1. From Case 1 above, this can happen in the equilibrium
of the pricing subgame only if 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
) > 1.
Then, the proﬁt function of ﬁrm  can be written as πh = (p− c)(1− θ), where p is the price
charged by ﬁrm . Since θ

=
ph

q

< 1, it is immediate that 0 < θ

< θ
h
≤ 1.
The ﬁrst-order condition suggests that the optimal price of ﬁrm  is ph

= c+q2 . To ensure that
ﬁrm  captures all consumers in the segment [θ

, 1], it must further be that the consumer with θ = 1
obtains at least as high a surplus from ﬁrm  as from ﬁrm h. From ﬁrm h, this consumer obtains
a surplus q
h
− c
h
(since he is oﬀered good h at price c
h
). From ﬁrm , he obtains q

− ph

. Adding
this extra restriction, the optimal price of ﬁrm  in this case is ph

= min{c
h
− (q
h
− q

), c+q2 }. The
optimal price of ﬁrm h is ph
h
(θ) = c
h
for all consumers in the range [0, θ
h
].
Lemma 3 In the equilibrium of the whole game, 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1.
Proof of Lemma 3: Given Proposition 3, all we need to show is that θ
h
< 1. The argument is
similar to that in Lemma 1. Again, we show that c′

< 1 in equilibrium. This implies that there
exists a q
h
such that ﬁrm h earns a positive proﬁt. Hence, ﬁrm h will not choose a q
h
such that
θ
h
= 1.
Suppose that c′

≥ 1. From the proof of Proposition 3, θh = 1 implies that 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chqh) ≥ 1,
or ch−cqh−q ≥ 2−
ch
qh
. First, suppose ch−cqh−q = 2−
ch
qh
. Then, θh− θ = 1− 12( chqh +
c
q
). The derivative of
this term with respect to q

is − c
′

q

−c

q

2 < 0 (since c′ >
c

q

). Hence, if q

falls slightly, the market
coverage of ﬁrm  increases.
Further, ph

− c

= 12(
c
h
q

q
h
− c

). The derivative of this w.r.t. q

is chq
h
− c′

. Now, the consumer
with type θ
h
is indiﬀerent between good  and good h. Hence, he obtains a positive surplus from
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good h. Since θ
h
= 1 by assumption, this implies c
h
≤ ph
h
< q
h
. Hence, chq
h
< c′

when c′

≥ 1.
Hence, this term also increases if q

falls slightly.
Now, π = (θh − θ)(ph − c). Since both terms increase when q falls, π increases when q falls.
Since the argument holds at any quality such that c′

≥ 1, it must be that c′

< 1 in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that θ
h
= 1, and 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
) > 1. It is immediate that a small reduction in
q

increases the market coverage of ﬁrm . In this case, its optimal price is ph

= min{c
h
− (q
h
−
q

), c+q2 }. Whichever of these two is lower, the derivative of ph − c , the proﬁt per unit, is less
than or equal zero whenever c′

≥ 1. Hence, reducing q

weakly improves the proﬁt per unit. Hence,
at equilibrium, it must be that c′

< 1.
Given that c′

< 1, as before, this implies that there exists a q
h
at which ﬁrm h earns a positive
proﬁt; that is, θ
h
< 1.
6.3.1 Derivation of Reaction Functions
We show (as an aside; this is used in Proof of Proposition 5) that the reaction functions are upward
sloping.
Lemma 4 (i) The reaction functions of both ﬁrms are upward-sloping in the range of quality such
that c′(q

) < 1.
(ii) Suppose both ﬁrms oﬀer the no-PP qualities, qn
h
, qn

, and ﬁrm h now adopts PP. Then, compared
to the no-PP case: (a) if ﬁrms remain at their original qualities, qn
h
, qn

, the optimal defensive
strategy of ﬁrm  is to charge a lower price (b) Compared to the no-PP case, if ﬁrm  remains at
its original quality, qn

, then the optimal strategy of ﬁrm h is to increase its quality.
Proof of Lemma 4
(i) We ﬁrst derive the reaction functions of the two ﬁrms. As shown in equations (3) and (4) of the
text, the proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms in this case are
πh

(q
h
, q

) = (θ
h
− θ

)(ph

− c

) =
(c
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
(18)
πh
h
(q
h
, q

) =
∫ 1
θ
h
(ph
h
(θ)− c
h
)dθ =
(ph

+ q
h
− q

− c
h
)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(19)
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We focus on an interior equilibrium with 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1. We restrict attention to qualities such
that c′(q

) < 1 because we have shown that the equilibrium qualities satisfy this restriction. The
reaction functions are valid for all qualities in this range; as shown in the proof of Lemma 3, if
c′(q

) < 1, there exist qualities q
h
at which ﬁrm h can earn a positive proﬁt (and therefore θ
h
< 1).
The ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm h is
∂πh
h
∂q
h
= 0,
(ph

+ q
h
− q

− c
h
)
q
h
− q

{
1− c′
h
+
q

(c′
h
q
h
− c
h
)
2(q
h
)2
− p
h

+ q
h
− q

− c
h
2(q
h
− q

)
}
= 0. (20)
Firm h’s reaction function, rh
h
(q

) is the solution to this equation.
The corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm  is
∂πh

∂q

= 0, which gives us
(c
h
q

− c

q
h
)(c

(q
h
− 2q

) + q

(c
h
− 2c′

(q
h
− q

))
(2q

(q
h
− q

))2
= 0. (21)
Since chq
h
>
c

q

, it cannot be that (c
h
q

− c

q
h
) = 0. Hence, the optimal quality of ﬁrm , q

is given
by the solution to
c

(q
h
− 2q

) + q

(c
h
− 2c′

(q
h
− q

)) = 0. (22)
Firm ’s reaction function, r
h
(q
h
) is the solution to this equation.
Now, let ψ be the left-hand side of equation (21), the ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm , and ψh the
left-hand side of equation (20), the ﬁrst order condition of ﬁrm h. Then, ∂ψ∂q
h
=
(c
h
−c

−c′

(q
h
−q

))(c

−c
h
+c′
h
(q
h
−q

))
2(q
h
−q

)3
.
Convexity of c(·) directly implies c
h
> c

+ c′

(q
h
− q

) and c′
h
>
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

. Hence, ∂ψ∂q
h
> 0, so that to
reach ψ = 0, ﬁrm  must increase its quality.
Next, consider ψh(qh , q). Recalling that p
h

is a function of q
h
, q

, we have
∂ψh
∂q

=
1
4
(
(c
h
− q
h
c′
h
)(c
h
− (2− c′

)q
h
)
q
h
2
+
(c′
h
+ c′

)(c
h
− c

)
(q
h
− q

)2
− (ch − c)
2
(q
h
− q

)3
− (c
′
h
c′

)
(q
h
− q

)
)
.
Consider the ﬁrst term. Since c(·) is strictly convex, c
h
< q
h
c′
h
. Further, by assumption, c′

< 1.
Hence, the ﬁrst term is strictly positive. Adding terms 2, 3 and 4 we have
∂ψh
∂q

=
(c
h
− c

− c′

(q
h
− q

))(c

− c
h
+ c′
h
(q
h
− q

))
4(q
h
− q

)3
.
Convexity of c(·) directly implies c
h
> c

+ c′

(q
h
− q

) and c′
h
>
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

. Hence, ∂ψh∂q

> 0, and to
reach ψh = 0, ﬁrm h must increase its quality.
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(ii) (a) Given pn

from equation (8) and ph

from Proposition 3, we have ph

< pn

if and only
if chq+cqh2q
h
<
2q
h
c

+q

c
h
+q
h
q

−q

2
(4q
h
−q

) . Cross-multiplying and simplifying, this condition reduces to
q

(q
h
− q

)(c
h
− q
h
+ q
h
( ch−cq
h
−q

− 1)) < 0. Now, q
h
> q

, and c
h
≤ q
h
(else ﬁrm h sells zero units).
Further, in equilibrium ch−cq
h
−q

+ chq
h
< 2 (since θ
h
< 1, from Lemma 3). Multiplying throughout by
q
h
and rearranging, this implies that c
h
− q
h
+ q
h
( ch−cq
h
−q

− 1) < 0. Hence ph

< pn

.
(ii) (b) The proﬁt function of the high quality ﬁrm is given by the equation πh
h
(q
h
, q

) =
(ph

+q
h
−q

−c
h
)2
2(q
h
−q

) .
Consider rh
h
(q

) the reaction function for ﬁrm h. Taking the partial of this expression with respect to
ph

and replacing the optimal price, gives the following ∂
∂ph

(
dπh
h
dq
h
) = 12(
c
h
−q
h
c′
h
q
h
+
(c
h
−c

−(q
h
−q

)c′
h
)
(q
h
−q

)2
).
The ﬁrst term is clearly negative. From the convexity of the cost function, the second term is
strictly less than 0, from which the inequality holds.
6.3.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose only ﬁrm h has PP. Substituting c(q) = Aq2, the proﬁt-maximization condition of ﬁrm 
reduces to (q
h
− 2q

)(q
h
− q

) = 0, which yields the reaction function q

= qh2 (since q = qh is not
proﬁt-maximizing). Similarly, the proﬁt-maximization condition of ﬁrm h reduces to (2−A(2q
h
+
q

)) (2 + 3A(q

− 2q
h
)) = 0. Since the reaction function of ﬁrm h is upward-sloping (from Lemma
2), it must be given by the second term in the above equation. This yields q
h
= 2+3Aq6A . Now,
simultaneously solving the two reaction functions gives the equilibrium qualities: qh
h
= 49A =
0.444
A ,
and qh

= 29A =
0.222
A . Both qualities are higher than the respective qualities in the no-PP case.
Again, it is immediate to verify that the constraints 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1 are satisﬁed.
Finally, we show that neither ﬁrm wants to leapfrog; that is, ﬁrm h does not want to choose a
quality lower than that of ﬁrm , and vice versa.
For convenience, call the ﬁrms 1 and 2 at this stage. Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses q1 = 0.444A , and ﬁrm
2 chooses q2 = 0.222A in equilibrium. Note that ﬁrm 1 has PP, and ﬁrm 2 does not. In equilibrium,
ﬁrm 1 is the high quality ﬁrm. However, we wish to rule out the following leapfrogs:
(i) ﬁrm 1 chooses some q1 < 0.222A , and becomes a lower quality ﬁrm.
(ii) ﬁrm 2 chooses some q2 > 0.444A , and becomes a higher quality ﬁrm.
Consider (i) ﬁrst. Suppose ﬁrm 2 chooses q2 = 0.222A , and ﬁrm 1 does leapfrog, and chooses
q1 <
0.222
A . In particular, let the optimal quality of ﬁrm 1, given that it has lower quality than ﬁrm
2, be denoted q1 = 0.222−A , where  ≥ 0. Since ﬁrm 1 has lower quality, but has PP, its proﬁt function
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is given by equation (1) of the paper (reproduced as equation (11) of the appendix). Replacing the
optimal price p
h
for the ﬁrm without PP, and cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2, we get
π1(qh , q) =
(q
h
q

+ Aq
h
2q

− q

2 − 2Aq
h
q

2 + Aq

3)2
8q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
=
(1 + A(q
h
− q

))2(q
h
− q

)q

8q
h
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.222A and q = q1 =
0.222−
A , we have
π1() =
0.56(0.222− )(1 + )2
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.121. Then, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is 0.008A . This is
less than its proﬁts at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.022A (see Table 1 on page 14 of the paper).
Hence, there is no incentive for the high quality ﬁrm to deviate and become the lower quality ﬁrm.
Next, consider case (ii). Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses quality q1 = 0.444A . Suppose that ﬁrm 2 deviates
to some quality higher than this, and becomes the higher quality ﬁrm. Let the new (after deviation)
quality level for the ﬁrm 2 be q2 = 0.444+A . Given that it has higher quality, the proﬁt function for
ﬁrm 2 is given by equation (2) of the text, or (12) of the appendix. Replacing the cost functions,
c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2 and then simplifying, we get
π2(qh , q) =
(1−A(q
h
+ q

))2(q
h
− q

)
2
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.444+A and q = q1 =
0.444
A , we have
π2() =
0.5(0.112− )2
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.037. Then, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 is 0.0001A . This is less
than its proﬁts at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.006A (see Table 1). Hence, there is no incentive
for the low quality ﬁrm to deviate and become the higher quality ﬁrm.
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6.4 Both Firms have PP
Proof of Proposition 5
As in the low-PP and high-PP cases, in the equilibrium of the whole game, 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1
(the argument is similar to Lemma 1, with the one diﬀerence that θ
h
= ch−cq
h
−q

; for brevity, we do
not repeat it here). Hence, we ignore the constraints 0 ≤ θ

≤ θ
h
≤ 1, and focus on the interior
solution.
The proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms in this case are:
πb
h
(q
h
, q

) =
∫ 1
θ
h
(c

+ θ(q
h
− q

)− c
h
)dθ =
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(23)
πb

(q
h
, q

) =
∫ θˆ
θ

(θq

− c

)dθ +
∫ θ
h
θˆ
(c
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)− c

)dθ =
(c
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
. (24)
As argued in the text, the proﬁt function of ﬁrm h is the same as in the low-PP case. Hence its
reaction function is also the same as in the low-PP case, and is given by the solution to equation
(16). Similarly, the proﬁt function of ﬁrm  is the same as in the high-PP case, so its reaction
function is given by the solution to equation (22).
(i) From equation (16), we know that the optimal quality of ﬁrm h is the solution to the equation
ψh(qh , q) = 1− 2c′h +
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

= 0. We evaluate ψh at the equilibrium qualities when only ﬁrm h has
PP, q
h
, q

. These are the solutions to the two equations (20) and (22).
From equation (20),
1− 2c′
h
+
c
h
− c

q
h
− q

= −q(c
′
h
− (c
h
/q
h
))
q
h
− 2 + ch − p
h

q
h
− q

+
c
h
− c

q
h
− q

.
Now, c′
h
>
c
h
q
h
since c(·) is convex. Further, q
h
− c
h
> q

− c

, else ﬁrm h has zero sales. Since
ph

> c

, this yields
c
h
−ph

q
h
−q

<
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

< 1. Therefore, at the qualities (q
h
, q

), ψh < 0. Hence, to reach
a quality at which ψh(qh , q) = 0, ﬁrm h must decrease its quality. Since both reaction functions
are upward sloping, ﬁrm  will also decrease its quality.
(ii) The reaction function of ﬁrm h is the same as in the low-PP case. From Proposition 2, this
is q
h
= q3 +
1
3A . Similarly, the reaction function of ﬁrm  is the same as in the high-PP case.
From Proposition 4, q

= qh2 . Solving these simultaneously, we have q
b
h
= 0.4A and q
b

= 0.2A . The
corresponding qualities in the low-PP case are 0.388A and
0.164
A . Clearly, both qualities are higher
when both ﬁrms have PP.
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Finally, we show that neither ﬁrm wants to leapfrog; that is, ﬁrm h does not want to choose a
quality lower than that of ﬁrm , and vice versa.
First, consider ﬁrm h. For convenience, call the ﬁrms 1 and 2 at this stage. Suppose ﬁrm 2
chooses q2 = 0.2A , which is the lower quality in equilibrium. In equilibrium, ﬁrm 1 chooses q1 =
0.4
A .
However, we wish to rule out a leapfrog, whereby ﬁrm 1 chooses some q1 < 0.2A , and becomes a
lower quality ﬁrm.
To show this, suppose ﬁrm 2 chooses q2 = 0.2A , and ﬁrm 1 does leapfrog, and chooses q1 <
0.2
A . In
particular, let the optimal quality of ﬁrm 1, given that it has lower quality than ﬁrm 2, be denoted
q1 = 0.2−A , where  ≥ 0. Since ﬁrm 1 has lower quality, its proﬁt function is given by equation (24).
Replacing the cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2 and then simplifying, we get
π1(qh , q) =
A2(q
h
− q

)q
h
q

2
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.2A and q = q1 =
0.2−
A , we have
π1() =
(0.02− 0.1)
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.1. Then, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is 0.001A . This is less
than its proﬁts at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.016A (see Table 1 on page 14 of the paper). Hence,
there is no incentive for the high quality ﬁrm to deviate and become the lower quality ﬁrm.
Next, we show that the low quality ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate and become the higher
quality ﬁrm. Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses quality q1 = 0.4A . Suppose that ﬁrm 2 deviates to some quality
higher than this, and becomes the higher quality ﬁrm. Let the new (after deviation) quality level
for the ﬁrm 2 be q2 = 0.4+A . Given that it has higher quality, the proﬁt function for ﬁrm 2 is given
by equation (23). Replacing the cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2 and then simplifying, we
get
π2(qh , q) =
(1−A(q
h
+ q

))2(q
h
− q

)
2
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.4+A and q = q1 =
0.4
A , we have
π2() =
0.5(0.2− )2
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.066. Then, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 is 0.0005A . This is less
than its proﬁts at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.008A (see Table 1). Hence, there is no incentive
for the low quality ﬁrm to deviate and become the higher quality ﬁrm.
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